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S E C R E T SANAA 002869

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TAGS: [ASEC](#) [AMGT](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [EAC](#) [COUNTER](#) [TERRORISM](#)

SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - OCTOBER 26, 2004

Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Begin Summary: On October 26, 2004, the Chief Of Mission chaired a core Emergency Action Committee meeting with COM, DCM, ORCA, DATT, FPD, LEGAT, SOC-Yemen, OMC, CONS, POLECON, PDO and RSO in attendance. The topic of discussion was the possible release of 138 prisoners from Republic of Yemen (ROYG) custody that has been held on various charges to include indigenous and transnational terrorism. EAC members reviewed what if any negative impact such a release would have on the American community and the current security profile. It was the consensus of EAC members that some of the prisoners on ROYG,s list were particularly dangerous and their release could seriously and negatively impact security. No new security measures have been recommended. End Summary.

2. (S/NF) EAC members reviewed the security impact of the Republic of Yemen,s prisoner release program noting:

- The release could expose western personnel to terrorist acts perpetrated by released detainees who are angry over the perceived influence that the American government had regarding their length stay in prison and/or driven by extremist ideology.

- LEGAT listed several instances where Yemen detainees committed terrorist acts against American citizens and interests after being released.

- Terrorists planned attacks in 2002 and 2003 against American and British interests but were interdicted by ROYG and US counter-terrorism efforts.

- A warden message was determined to be appropriate with possible modifications to Yemen,s Travel Advisory.

- The initial stand-down of various US government programs outside of the capital city to lower the exposure of US citizen contractors in remote or isolated areas.

- RSO noted soft targets within Sanaa where NGO programs are concentrated but EAC members did not see an immediate threat in the capital city not requiring Sanaa based programs to scale back.

- Embassy officers are unable to verify who is actually detained and who is moving in and out of the penal system despite ROYG claims regarding specific detentions.

- Travel by USG personnel should continue to be reviewed by RSO prior to approval to better ensure proper security consideration in a changing security environment.

3. (S/NF) The EAC had no specific threat information associated with the release of detainees.

4.(S/NF) The COM advised the EAC that follow-on EAC meetings would be required as the security situation unfolded in light of ROYG decisions on prisoner releases.

5. (S/NF) RSO met with the MOI Chief of Staff Brigadier General Sunidar following the meeting. BG Sunidar confirmed ROYG deliberations to determine who would be among released detainees and assured RSO that past release programs were successful and did not result in any recidivism by &reformed and released8 detainees. (RSO: Comment USG statistics show that in fact released prisoners have in the past been involved in terrorism following their release by Yemen authorities.

6. (S/NF) The Ambassador concluded the EAC meeting by stating that follow-up EAC meetings would be held as necessary to adjust security programs to the impact of any releases by ROYG and impact to bi-lateral relations by USG actions in light of the releases. The COM directed the RSO to ensure visible security measures as appropriate to the current threat environment.

KRAJESKI